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Abstract: The relative success of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
is a puzzle for most theories of regional integration. This is due to its having
achieved remarkable progress in spite of lacking features such as significant levels
of previous interdependence (demand factor) or major regional institutions (sup-
ply factor). To account for this puzzle, it has been claimed that the operation of
MERCOSUR rests on presidential diplomacy. Such a mechanism is understood
as the resort to direct negotiations between the national presidents whenever a
crucial decision has to be made or a critical conflict solved. This article argues
that presidential diplomacy—understood as political, summit diplomacy as op-
posed to institutionalized, professional diplomacy—is insufficient to account for
the performance of MERCOSUR. Through the empirical analysis of three critical
episodes, the article shows how institutional structures, shaped by the system of
government of the member countries, have sustained presidential intervention
and, hence, the process of regional integration.
INTRODUCTION
The experience of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) does
not fit mainstream theories of regional integration. The two major con-
temporary currents, namely liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik
1998) and supranational governance (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998),
regard society as the point of departure for integration, as transnational
transactors increase their exchanges and subsequently call on national
* A previous version of this article was presented at the 2003 meeting of the Latin
American Studies Association, Dallas, Texas, March 27–29. Translations of interviews,
documents and newspapers are my own. I am deeply grateful to Alexandra Barahona
de Brito, Sebastián Etchemendy, Carlos da Fonseca, Félix Peña, Philippe Schmitter, Luís
de Sousa and the anonymous reviewers of LARR.
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or transnational authorities to adjust regulations and policies to the new
situation. These approaches draw on evidence collected from the unique
case of the European Union (EU). MERCOSUR, however, arose from
the political will of national governments, and only thereafter gener-
ated public demand for further integration (Malamud 2003).
Liberal intergovernmentalism sees economic interdependence as a
strong pre-condition for integration. As trade liberalization augments
export dependence and intra-industry trade, stronger pressure for inte-
gration arises. Regional institutions are thus conceived of as mechanisms
to lock in and enforce agreements rather than as autonomous actors or
broader political arenas. In spite of the crucial weight this approach ac-
cords national states, the decision to either pool or delegate power to
the regional level is regarded as unavoidable to allow for higher levels
of complex interaction. The history of MERCOSUR, however, runs
against two of these arguments: first, it did not emerge from either in-
creased economic interdependence or social demands; second, it has not
created a significant institutional structure.
Supranational governance theory, on the other hand, stresses the sig-
nificance of four main actors in pushing forward European integration:
national states, transnational transactors, the European Commission, and
the European Court of Justice. The latter two are supranational institu-
tions that do not exist in MERCOSUR, a fact that, added to the lack of
importance of transnational transactors, has left national states as su-
preme actors.1 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998, 19) have also called
attention to “the rule-centered logic of institutionalization,” that leads
transactors to demand clearer and more predictable rules as interde-
pendence increases. While increasing interdependence has created the
need to manage a growing number of crises and coordination problems,
in MERCOSUR, transactors seem to demand particular decisions rather
than general rules. For such a task, by and large, national presidents
have been perceived as more able—more accessible, more responsive,
more effective, faster—than any other actors to reach decisions.
It is commonplace to assert that the working of MERCOSUR has fun-
damentally rested on presidential diplomacy (Danese 1999; Núñez 1997).
This mechanism is understood as the customary resort to direct nego-
tiations between national presidents every time a crucial decision has to
be made or a critical conflict needs to be resolved. In spite of the ”presi-
dential” adjective, this kind of practice makes reference to political, sum-
mit diplomacy—as opposed to bureaucratic, professional diplomacy;
therefore, it is not conceptually different from the practice developed by
1. The main contrast with liberal intergovernmentalism is that national governments
respond neither to domestic pressures nor to increasing interdependence, but rather
take the initiative of pursuing integration.
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chief executives of non-presidential regimes—such as prime ministers
in parliamentary democracies (Danese 2001). Supposedly, in
MERCOSUR, the successive Argentine and Brazilian presidents since
1985 have carried out presidential diplomacy with a free hand to ac-
commodate the issues at stake in the way they saw fit. This article re-
considers the “presidential diplomacy” argument on the grounds that,
while not incorrect, it does not provide a truly accurate explanation of
proceedings and results of MERCOSUR. Through an empirical analysis
of three critical episodes of MERCOSUR history, the article shows how
institutional incentives and constraints, shaped by the presidential for-
mat of the member countries, have supported the process of regional
integration.
Most presidential regimes in Latin America have been described as
asymmetric, unbalanced, hyperpresidential or concentrationist when
compared to the U.S. case (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Nino 1992;
Shugart and Carey 1992; von Mettenheim 1997). This article advances
the hypothesis that, in MERCOSUR, the member states’ presidents con-
centrate enough power as to either prevail over or circumvent other veto
players such as the cabinet2 and congress in a way that is impossible for
either parliamentary executives or balanced presidential systems. It ex-
amines the role of presidents as both policy crafters and dispute settlers
in order to assess the real magnitude of the role played by chief execu-
tives in key policy areas. The institutional features that shape presiden-
tial intervention are identified and evaluated, with a view to setting forth
an account of Southern Cone regional integration that explains its unex-
pected singularities.
After a brief introduction that discusses the genesis and operation of
MERCOSUR, the article focuses on three events that have marked its
short history. These include two controversies over the special regimes
that were established at the beginning of the process and which are still
in force for automobiles and sugar. The third is the outburst and man-
agement of one of the most serious crises the bloc has faced to date,
triggered by the Brazilian devaluation of 1999. The methodology draws
partly on the supranational governance approach, as it is especially sen-
sitive to different policy areas and to day-to-day politics. At the same
time, it draws on the intergovernmental approach to preference forma-
tion, for the hypothesis tested here challenges the liberal assumption
that states act as agents of domestic social actors.
2. In a presidential system, the cabinet is not formally a veto player. However, the fact
that most presidential regimes are governed by party coalitions means that partisan
veto players may shift from the legislature to the cabinet, making it an additional veto
point.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW
MERCOSUR is presently an incomplete customs union that aims to
become a common market. It was created on March 26, 1991, when pre-
vious agreements between Argentina and Brazil were expanded in or-
der to include Paraguay and Uruguay. Although it has delivered less
than it originally promised, the bloc has tripled intraregional trade flows
and has become an acknowledged actor in world trade and a consistent
target of foreign investment. MERCOSUR is one of the most advanced
regional groupings in terms of formal integration.3 All these achieve-
ments notwithstanding, it has not developed any kind of autonomous
regional authority and is ruled exclusively by intergovernmental bod-
ies made up of representatives of the member governments. The high-
est formal authority is the Common Market Council (CMC), integrated
by the foreign and economy ministers of each country. According to
former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, there was an early
decision not to institutionalize the integration process until it had reached
a safe “cruising altitude” (Caputo 1999). The structure of MERCOSUR
contrasts sharply with that of the European Union, as the latter has cre-
ated strong institutions since its inception in 1951. Moreover, three of its
highest bodies—the European Parliament, the Court of Justice and the
Commission—are of a supranational nature.
Both the embryonic (1985–1991) and the postfoundational stage (from
1991 onwards) of MERCOSUR have been characterized by a remark-
able degree of presidential activism. Argentina’s Raúl Alfonsín and
Brazil’s José Sarney took the first, unexpected step toward creating
MERCOSUR in 1985, when both countries were inaugurating their demo-
cratic regimes and there was no social demand for a rapprochement
between the two, historically aloof, neighbors. In 1991, Argentina’s Carlos
Menem and Brazil’s Fernando Collor de Mello went a step further, in-
viting Paraguay and Uruguay to join the venture. The four countries
signed the Treaty of Asunción, which was the birth certificate of
MERCOSUR. Shortly thereafter, an additional agreement was signed:
the Protocol of Brasília, as it was called, established an ad hoc—as op-
posed to standing—dispute-settlement mechanism. Some years later, in
1994, Menem and Brazil’s new president, Itamar Franco, signed the Pro-
tocol of Ouro Preto, consolidating the formal structure of MERCOSUR,
which has been kept virtually untouched since then. After 1995, it was
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the new Brazilian president, who took over
the command of MERCOSUR, first with Menem and later with Fernando
de la Rúa. The presidents of the smaller states would play a lesser role,
3. The four levels of economic integration are: free trade zone, customs union, com-
mon market, and economic union.
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although their intervention has always been greater than any other ac-
tors’ except that of the presidents of the bigger states.
The presidents have exhibited significant autonomy in decision mak-
ing regarding MERCOSUR affairs. Nonetheless, their decision to em-
bark on an integration process and their performance in this area have
been shaped by institutional incentives and some (albeit few) constraints.
As striking as it may seem, the presidents adopted decisions that ap-
peared to compromise national sovereignty without facing serious ve-
toes from other relevant actors. This was due mainly to two factors: first,
a high degree of concentration of power in the hands of the chief execu-
tive enabled them to overcome or circumvent potential veto players
(Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Malamud
2001); second, foreign policy typically offers chief executives greater room
to maneuver than domestic politics do (Rogowski 1999; Schlesinger 1974;
Silva 1989). Some recent works analyze thoroughly the impact of the
type of democracy on policy outcomes, thus paying greater attention to
the link between presidential systems and public policy (Eaton 2000;
Haggard and McCubbins 2001); however, they do not focus on foreign
policy but rather mainly on budgetary and regulatory policies. Academ-
ics such as Milner (1993, 1997) have studied the differential influence of
presidential and parliamentary systems on foreign policy, but rarely have
any presidential democracies outside the United States been included
in the analyses. This article contributes to filling this lacuna by analyz-
ing how a specific brand of presidentialism has dealt with a specific
foreign policy matter, namely regional integration. To do so, it makes
the case that the presidents of MERCOSUR member states have concen-
trated power and enjoyed high levels of autonomy, mainly because of
institutional factors, which includes decisional autonomy from the as-
sembly and the cabinet, legislative initiative, decree power, and veto
power. The following case studies provide empirical support for this
hypothesis.
THE SPECIAL REGIME: AUTOMOBILES
There are many reasons why cars have become a central issue for
MERCOSUR. In the first place, global competition everywhere is un-
dermining the national bases of the automobile industry. However, it
would be improper to speak of an integrated world automobile market,
as the sector is organized into regional clusters rather than on a global
level (Bastos Tigre et al. 1999). Second, cars are believed to be
MERCOSUR’s equivalent to coal and steel for the early European Com-
munity. In other words, it is the sector in which intra-industrial comple-
mentation has developed most because it is a highly dynamic sector
where expanding investment and labor markets are concerned. In the
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third place, the automobile regime was established at the beginning of
the integration process and acquired a special status as the only sector
that persisted despite all the subsequent changes. As key Argentine ne-
gotiator Roberto Lavagna pointed out, this is “the only sectoral agree-
ment that survived the methodological change of 1990, thus becoming a
successful example of productive expansion and technological modern-
ization with a reasonable balance between its parts” (Lavagna 1999, 7–
8). According to the same analyst, the reason for this outcome was that
“the auto sector has had enough political strength to prevent the dis-
mantling of the sectoral project” (Lavagna 2000). Whether or not these
sectoral interests had the political strength that Lavagna claims, the de-
cision to continue with the sectoral agreements in this area was not po-
litically contested. Instead, there was a joint decision between Argentina
and Brazil to go on with this strategy, which was heralded, defended,
and rescued—when in jeopardy—by the national executives.
The foundation that fostered integration between the national auto
industries was established by Protocol 21 of the Economic Complemen-
tation Agreement no. 14, which Argentina and Brazil signed at the end
of 1990. It was explicitly defined as provisional, and its terms were sup-
posed to be renegotiated a few years later. Indeed, Protocol 21 was elimi-
nated four years later, when the Ouro Preto Protocol consolidated the
customs union when it was signed in December 1994. In its place, CMC
Decision 29/94 created an ad hoc technical committee that was requested
to elaborate, before June 1, 1995, a proposal for a common auto regime
that was to enter into force on January 1, 2000. Meanwhile, in addition
to Decision 29/94, a bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil
reciprocally acknowledged the national regimes still in force in both
countries.4 Both partners also agreed not to introduce unilateral restric-
tions on trade within the Free Trade Zone. From June 1995 onwards,
bilateral agreements could be modified only to increase intra-regional
trade and never to bestow advantages on the respective industries with
the purpose of attracting investment. This was to change dramatically
shortly afterwards, though.
The Remaking of the Automobile Regime and the 1995 Crisis
Between 1990 and 1996, there was a sharp increase in intraregional
trade in cars as a consequence of tariff reductions and agreements to
4. The Argentine Special Regime, implemented in 1991, consisted of compensating
imports with exports and was expected to last until the end of 1999. The regime encour-
aged assembly plants to register a fair balance of trade by levying a tariff of 2% on each
noncompensated dollar. For its part, the Brazilian Popular Car Regime was to last until
December 1996 (Sajem 1999).
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balance imports and exports.5 However, by mid-1995 Brazil was suffer-
ing from economic distress as a result of the Mexican crisis. Argentina
was facing economic turmoil as well, although its public and financial
sectors were more solid than Brazil’s. Automobile production remained
stable in Argentina essentially because of its exports to Brazil, which
generated a growing imbalance and raised bitter complaints among Bra-
zilian producers. The government was expected to take protective mea-
sures, but these were not supposed to apply within MERCOSUR but to
be addressed toward extra-regional trade.
The crisis finally came to a head on June 13, when Brazil announced
that it would limit automobile imports during the second half of the
year to 50 percent of the total of imports of the first half of the year.
Surprisingly, Provisional Measure 2410 considered no exception regard-
ing MERCOSUR partners.6 This fact angered the Argentine authorities.
The Brazilian presidential spokesman, Sergio Amaral, communicated
the decision to two Argentine negotiators, Jorge Campbell and Carlos
Magariños, who had flown to Brasília. However, the Brazilian cabinet
was divided about the decision, as Finance Minister Pedro Malan op-
posed trade restrictions, whereas Planning Minister José Serra supported
them. Both were close aides to the president, so he usually mediated
between them, but this time the hard-liners carried the day.
The following day, Argentine papers covered their front pages with
the alarming news: “Brazil Limits Car Imports from Argentina.”7 Actu-
ally, although the quotas were not limited to Argentina, the issue be-
came highly sensitive and threatened MERCOSUR. Argentine officials
and producers considered Cardoso’s decree a violation of the Protocol
of Ouro Preto, which guaranteed free trade among all MERCOSUR part-
ners. However, this protocol also set up the requisite of balanced trade,
so the Brazilian government justified the measure by pointing to the
lack of equilibrium between imports and exports.
The conflict was one of the most serious that MERCOSUR had faced
thus far. Furthermore, it was exacerbated by the proximity of the
MERCOSUR Economic Forum, a meeting organized by the World Eco-
nomic Forum, which was scheduled to take place later that week, from
June 18 to 20, in São Paulo. On June 14, Menem threatened to boycott
the most expectantly awaited event of the forum, the presidential
5. It should be noted that, apart from free trade, there were other reasons contributing
to this surprising performance, including parallel macroeconomic developments and
economic recovery (Bastos Tigre et al. 1999).
6. Provisional measure 2410 established a restriction to Brazilian imports regardless
of the country of origin, thus making no difference between Mercosur members and
non-members.
7. “Brasil limitó la importación de autos argentinos,” Clarín, June 14, 1995.
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summit. Menem’s threat engendered feverish negotiations aimed at
preventing an incident that would have such a negative effect on the
reputation of MERCOSUR.
Faced with this strong stance, Cardoso ultimately decided to post-
pone the enforcement of the decree for thirty days. It is somewhat
puzzling that either the presidents themselves or second-level officials
carried out the negotiations, whereas top cabinet ministers were left out.
Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella was stuck in Rome due to an
airlines strike, and his deputy, Fernando Petrella, did not take part in
the process either. Only the number three at the foreign ministry, Jorge
Campbell, got involved. The presidents decided to hold direct conver-
sations in order to work out a solution. As put by an Argentine journal-
ist, “notwithstanding Di Tella’s transportation troubles, the concrete thing
is that the crisis was personally handled by Menem, who consulted
Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo rather than the foreign ministry.”8
According to public sources, Cardoso himself called Menem at 5 p.m.
on June 15 and sent him a personal letter at 8 p.m. This time, direct
presidential intervention was not limited to the main countries:
Paraguay’s Juan Carlos Wasmosy and Uruguay’s Julio Sanguinetti also
offered themselves as personal mediators in the dispute between their
larger partners (Sanguinetti 2001).
Over the weekend, Menem responded to Cardoso with a letter in
which he accepted the invitation to attend the regional meeting. It was
formally agreed that all four presidents would meet and that Menem
and Cardoso would hold a bilateral summit thereafter. In spite of the
provisional accord, Brazil ratified the validity of the restrictions but ac-
cepted that it should negotiate them with Argentina. Strangely enough,
neither partner ever mentioned the possibility of appealing to the Pro-
tocol of Brasília, the institutional instrument by which MERCOSUR part-
ners are supposed to resolve their disputes.
Shortly afterwards, the Brazilian administration itself was caught up
in the controversy. The official line was that the establishment of a na-
tional automobile regime had to be implemented prior to any regional
agreement in the area. Therefore, cabinet hawks criticized the negotia-
tors who had consented to establish a regional regime at Ouro Preto
when only one of the main countries involved, Argentina, already had a
national regime. On Monday 19, Menem and Cardoso finally held the
bilateral summit but only agreed to sign a declaration stating that nego-
tiations were to continue. The discussion was leaked to the public, and
neither Wasmosy nor Sanguinetti were able to prevent it. Cardoso ex-
plicitly asked Menem to act “politically, in order to restore a balance
between the parts. The most important thing here is political will.” Again,
8. Clarín, June 16, 1995, 5.
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no mention of established institutional procedures was made. In turn,
Menem replied: “we can negotiate, but only within the frame of the
signed agreements that cannot be changed—as in Argentina they have
been incorporated into national legislation.”9 The Argentine discourse
was more institutional, whereas the Brazilian focused on the issue of
political will.
The following day, the situation took a dramatic turn. Menem and
Cavallo admitted that the negotiations of 1994 had left Brazil at a disad-
vantage and toned down their accusations. Meanwhile, a heated dis-
cussion arose within the Argentine cabinet. Di Tella and Cavallo blamed
each other for the situation, although Cavallo later grudgingly acknowl-
edged the reasonable nature of Brazilian claims when, during the bilat-
eral negotiation, he was informed that MERCOSUR technical committees
had never met to adjust and enforce the automobile agreement.
President Cardoso finally promised there would be a negotiated settle-
ment of the dispute and suspended the application of the quotas. Subse-
quently, a comprehensive agreement was reached: Brazil would not apply
quotas to Argentina for the remainder of 1995, and the two countries
would begin negotiations to establish a definitive common regime that
would last until 2000 (Cason 2000).
Circumventing Regional Institutions: Interpresidential Dynamics
Both Argentina and Brazil considered the automobile issue highly
sensitive because it was about much more than just trade. As the Argen-
tine industry secretary Carlos Magariños noted, “the real dispute is over
investments” (Cason 2000, 31). Therefore, it was not only trade balance
but also industrial planning and even macroeconomic stability that were
at stake. This fact explains why national governments were so sensitive
to the emerging conflict and so eager to solve it promptly. What it does
not explain, however, is why the presidents got involved when this was
an issue that lesser diplomatic or technical public officials and domestic
bureaucracies could have managed in a technical way.
The automobile sector in MERCOSUR was built around a few large
transnational companies that did not coordinate with one another. They
designed their strategies with an eye on the integration process but got
used to dealing directly with national governments from the outset. For
their part, governments were receptive to the demands of companies
and followed company preferences, as manifested by the maintenance
of the automobile regime. As a result, the companies were used to get-
ting what they wanted: direct links with decision makers and active
policies in their favor. The governments were also satisfied, as they
9. Clarín, July 20, 1995, 2–3.
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wanted to attract investment and create jobs. Brazilian Provisional Mea-
sure 2410 disrupted the cross-border alignment between governments
and companies, splitting up interests along national lines.
The automobile market was anything but free. Government interven-
tion guaranteed not only positive incentives but also protective mea-
sures against extra- and intraregional competition. This intervention was
not only accepted but also actively demanded by auto firms: as a Brazil-
ian minister put it, “the auto firms love quotas” (as cited, unnamed, in
Cason 2000, 30). On the Argentine side Oscar Salvi, director of Toyota
Argentina, defended the protective measures, stating that “the tradi-
tional policies of Brazil . . . have been, if not imperialistic, at least over-
whelming” (Cason 2000, 31).
The strategies of the car makers were therefore not market-oriented but
rather government-oriented. The Brazilian government was well aware
of this, and it feared that existing trade regulations for the auto sector would
influence transnational investments in MERCOSUR to the benefit of Ar-
gentina. On the other hand, many in Argentina feared that the country
would have become a “province of Brazil” had the situation not been re-
verted, as bluntly stated by well-known political journalist Mariano
Grondona.10 Paradoxically, the only surviving sector of the original inte-
gration project was deeply embedded in domestic, nationalist sentiment.
The dynamic of conflict within the automobile sector was the result
of the interests and strategies of the actors involved. In almost every
episode, the preferred alternative was to delay fulfilling treaties and
postpone negotiations to achieve a permanent settlement. Likewise, the
favored course of action was always based on informal, bilateral (i.e.,
Argentina-Brazil) negotiations and never on the request for formal pro-
cedures. Whenever the possibility of resorting to the mechanisms estab-
lished by the Protocol of Brasília or the Protocol of Ouro Preto arose,
businessmen insisted that it was impossible to respect them “for the
time being, at least” (Sajem 1999, 79). The outcome of the 1995 crisis in
the auto sector was the same as that of all subsequent conflicts over the
sector: the maintenance of the status quo. Neither buildup nor spillover
turned out,11 but for most observers the preservation of MERCOSUR
was a good enough result, given the region’s disappointing experience
with integration and the magnitude of the conflict.
With MERCOSUR in place for only four years, few people were ready
to consider its institutional performance satisfactory. Fernando Henrique
Cardoso himself strongly criticized some of its features:
We, Brazilians, invented the theory of a non-institutional MERCOSUR, based on
the direct relation between the governments and, fundamentally, the
10. “La Argentina, provincia de Brasil,” La Nación, January 28, 1996.
11. See Schmitter (1970) for a discussion of these concepts.
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presidents. Whenever there is a crisis, Menem, Wasmosy, Sanguinetti and myself
have a talk. We even decide on minor problems . . . Nonsense. Presidents should
not get involved in such things . . . I even had to solve a problem regarding auto-
mobile quotas with Menem in São Paulo! (Cardoso and Toledo 1998, 126).
What Cardoso calls a Brazilian-crafted theory and then calls mistaken, is
nothing less than the way MERCOSUR has worked since its inception. “In-
ter-presidentialism,” a term coined to identify this governing style (Malamud
2003), kept MERCOSUR ticking. Because of their institutional capabilities
and the historical preeminence of the presidency, the presidents were tar-
geted as the only possible suppliers of decisions, enforcement, and dispute
resolution. Hence, every demand—from the most significant to the most
trivial, arising from national producers or foreign governments—was chan-
neled directly through the presidents. When applied to the 1995 auto crisis,
this procedure proved to be predictable and effective.
THE SPECIAL REGIME: SUGAR
The sugar regime is a prime case for gauging presidential interven-
tion in MERCOSUR, for the hypothesis advanced here faces a direct
challenge. The reason is that a number of authors have argued that na-
tional parliaments (Vigevani et al. 2001), the joint parliamentary com-
mission (Mustapic and Geneyro 2000), or domestic social actors (Lucca
2001; Romero 2001; Vigevani et al. 2001) in MERCOSUR have played an
important role in shaping this regime. Consequently, the analysis of the
relative weight of each actor—executives, legislatures, and social actors—
in shaping the final outcome is likely to feed controversy and, in so do-
ing, stimulate further research on the working of MERCOSUR.
The Sugar Regime: Nature and Conflicts
On June 30, 2000, a presidential communiqué issued in the wake of a
CMC meeting held in Buenos Aires advocated the integration of sugar
into the free trade zone and the common tariff. Concrete proposals were
notably absent, however. Between 1985 and 2000, no improvement in
cooperation or integration had been achieved in this area. Stagnation
was evident; its causes were not.
Sugar has been a hot issue since the beginning of MERCOSUR. Argen-
tina and Brazil had, and still have, opposing interests resulting from a
high productivity differential. The differential is not due to different uses
of technology, which are similar in both countries, but to the indirect sub-
sidies that Brazil allocates to the production of sugar cane.12 This policy
12. It is also true, however, that economies of scale, transportation infrastructure, and
the weather favor Brazil more than Argentina in sugar production.
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dates back to 1975, when the first oil crisis led the Brazilian government
to encourage the use of cane alcohol in gasoline—the so-called Programa
Proálcool, which was seen as a strategic choice of paramount importance
by the military administration (Fávero 2000). From then on, the produc-
tion of sugar was artificially increased, and it became, not the main prod-
uct of cane, but a byproduct tradable at marginal prices (Lucca 2001).
The effects of the productivity differential on trade are sizeable. The
subsidies to cane have turned Brazil into the largest producer of sugar in
the world: its share in global trade ranks close to 30 percent. To properly
assess the magnitude of this figure, it should be taken into account that
sugar is one of the most protected commodities worldwide (Fávero 2000;
Romero 2001). Argentina, on the other hand, faces a difficult situation,
which is due to tough foreign competition and aggravated by the domes-
tic conditions in which the production of sugar takes place. The Argentine
sugar crop is spread over five provinces in particular, the most important
of which are Tucumán, Salta, and Jujuy, all located in the poor northwest-
ern region.13 Sugar constitutes the basis of the regional economies in all
three provinces, and it is the most significant source of employment—
both direct and indirect—after the public administration. Given the fed-
eral arrangements established by the Argentine constitutional regime, and
given the social and economic reasons just mentioned, the senators and
deputies representing the northwestern provinces constitute a solid bloc
in Congress that seek to defend their “sugar constituents.”
The Brazilian government has always insisted on the prompt inclusion
of sugar into the free trade zone. By contrast, Argentina has sought to
delay this outcome through a variety of strategies. The most conciliatory
sectors in Argentina have accepted only the gradual incorporation of sugar
into the free trade area. Their aim was to establish a ten-year transition
period during which the sector would establish protective mechanisms to
guarantee supply for the domestic market. Brazil, on the other hand, pro-
posed a transition period of no more than twelve months. The two stances
were impossible to reconcile. Time was not the only source of disagree-
ment: some of Argentina’s toughest sectors had even asked Brazil to abol-
ish the Proálcool system, a demand that was rejected outright. Brazil claims
that there are strategic, political, and ecological reasons—not just economic
ones—to maintain the plan, so it could not be abandoned.
Given the complexity of the issue and the contradictory interests that
had prevented any agreement, in 1994 the CMC resolved to create an ad
hoc committee and to establish the special sugar regime. Three decisions
were adopted between August 1994 and December 199614 whereby the
13. By contrast, Brazilian sugar is grown mostly in the wealthy states of the South.
14. CMC Decision 7, August 5, 1994; CMC Decision 19, December 17, 1994; and CMC
Decision 16, December 16, 1996.
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committee was requested to define a regime that would adapt the sugar
sector to the customs union. There were two parameters: the proposal
had to aim at gradual liberalization of intra-MERCOSUR sugar trade,
and it had to neutralize distortions stemming from the asymmetries be-
tween different national policies. The initial deadline was November 1,
1995 but was later extended to May 31, 1997. The latter date brought with
it the first of two serious crises that MERCOSUR faced over sugar, with
the second taking place in 2000. They are analyzed below.
Circumventing the Parliaments: Dispute Settlement through Presidential
Competences
Between 1995 and 1997, Argentina acrimoniously questioned the
“MERCOSURness” of Brazilian sugar subsidies. According to Senator
Alberto Tell (Partido Justicialista [PJ], Jujuy), “against subsidized sugar
Argentina cannot compete, as it has a free and deregulated regime.”15
Cane croppers and their representatives demanded that there should be
no additional protection, but rather that sugar imported from Brazil
should cost as much as that coming from any other country. In the same
vein, Brazilian deputy Paulo Bornhausen (Partido da Frente Liberal
[PFL], Santa Catarina) countered that: “Argentina’s wheat exports are
based on strongly subsidized crops. This fact makes Brazilian produc-
ers unable to compete in fair conditions with Argentine-imported
wheat.”16 The menace of retaliation was clear. These positions delineated
the scenario in which both congresses would confront one another, em-
bracing defensive strategies on behalf of their respective interest groups.
In May 1997, the Argentine Congress passed a law (Ley 24.822) im-
posing the same tariff on imports of Brazilian sugar as that applied to
sugar from non-MERCOSUR countries. It was intended to be in effect
as long as the asymmetries caused by the subsidies to the Proálcool Pro-
gram remained in place. Although the Brazilian authorities denied hav-
ing exerted any pressure on the Argentine government,17 Menem vetoed
the law through Decree 471/97. The alleged reason was that Ley 24.822
contradicted MERCOSUR treaties, a stance that coincided with the offi-
cial Brazilian position (Vigevani et al. 2001).
Some months later the dispute over the status of sugar trade was
reinitiated, and in September 1997 the crisis peaked. On September 3,
the Argentine Senate rejected the executive veto, sticking to the position
adopted earlier by Congress. Against the position manifested by
15. “El Congreso rechazó el veto a la ley del azúcar,” Clarín, September 4, 1997.
16. “Câmara ameaça retaliação contra Argentina,” O Estado de São Paulo, September 6,
1997.
17. “Disputa pelo açúcar,” Gazeta Mercantil, May 25, 1997.
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Economy Minister Roque Fernández and Foreign Minister Guido Di
Tella, the congressional vote was unanimous. The electoral campaign
for the congressional mid-term elections was under way, and no legisla-
tor wanted to be exposed to criticism by paving an open road for Brazil-
ian sugar imports.
The argument escalated bitterly after the overriding of the veto. Re-
action on the Brazilian side was not long in coming. In the Brazilian
congress “there were retaliation threats, aimed at limiting imports of
Argentine wheat. Apart from its socio-economic significance, the epi-
sode had intense repercussions because it took place within a delicate
political context, marked by public divergences between Brazil and Ar-
gentina regarding the reform of the UN Security Council” (Seixas Corrêa
1999, 252). By public divergences, Seixas Corrêa meant the obstacles that
Argentine diplomats were placing to Brazilian attempts to secure a per-
manent seat on the UN Security Council should a reform of the UN
charter take place. These divergences were no more than background
noise; however, the real issue was conflicting sectoral interests and their
parliamentary echoes.
The Brazilian executive adopted a consistently prudent stance
throughout the conflict. Cardoso and his aides were aware that Argen-
tine legislators were acting under pressure of the electoral campaign, so
they opted to trust the efforts that the Menem administration was mak-
ing to limit the damage. The Argentine executive publicly condemned
the congressional position and eschewed legislative proposals that
ranged from proposing a new bill revoking Law 24.822 to contesting its
constitutionality before the Supreme Court. Simultaneously, the gov-
ernment requested more time to fix the problem from its Brazilian coun-
terpart. There were some officials on the Brazilian side—notably Foreign
Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia18—who were not convinced of the sin-
cerity of the Argentine position, but Cardoso chose to give Menem the
benefit of the doubt.
The situation appeared to have culminated in a dangerous deadlock.
According to Danese (2001), it was then “clear that the situation was
getting to an unbearable point and that a firm presidential intervention
would be necessary to move things forward. Therefore, a presidential
meeting was agreed upon.” On November 10, Menem traveled to
Brasília. The trip was not an isolated gesture; as the Brazilian deputy
foreign minister later testified,
there is an observable pattern according to which MERCOSUR trade crises are
overcome through top-level political bargains, which invariably reaffirm the
commitment to regional integration . . . The official visit of Menem to Brazil, on
18. “Em nota oficial, Itamaraty manifesta ‘séria preocupação’,” Gazeta Mercantil, Sep-
tember 5, 1997.
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November 10, 1997, reversed the negative atmosphere created by the sugar cri-
sis of September 1997 (Seixas Corrêa 1999, 252–3).
The controversial law was still in force, however, and a formal solu-
tion had yet to be found. Finally, the Argentine president adopted a for-
mula that dated back to the Viceroyalty of La Plata: “acátese, pero no se
cumpla” (“acknowledge but do not obey”). In ancient times, this prac-
tice worked well for rulings coming from Spain; now, they worked
against the laws originating in the Argentine Congress. The tariff was
never applied.
Presidential dominance within the national Congresses and the Joint
Parliamentary Commission is best underscored by the second sugar
episode. On August 24, 2000, the Argentine Congress passed another
law that was based on the usual arguments and aimed to protect Argen-
tine cane from Brazilian competition. The law extended the validity of
Decree 797/1992, which had established a protection regime for the sugar
industry that was set to expire in December 2000 and established no
further deadlines. Brazilian officials issued condemnatory responses,
whereas the Brazilian Congress threatened to limit imports of food con-
taining sugar from Argentina. President de la Rúa was upset about the
Argentine legislative decision. He was expected in Brasília on August
31, where a South American summit was set to take place, and was not
pleased to be received in an unfriendly climate. After a bitter cabinet
meeting, he sent his foreign minister19 to negotiate with the deputies
from the northwestern provinces in order to avoid “a war between the
Brazilian and Argentine congresses.”20
While President Menem’s visit of November 1997 had allowed the
softening of tensions between the two assemblies, providing a tempo-
rary resolution for the first sugar episode, this time resolution appeared
to be more difficult. The risk of an outbidding conflict that could jeopar-
dize the whole process looked greater. MERCOSUR had not yet over-
come the effects of the 1999 crisis, and legislators from both countries
were threatening retaliation even when no electoral campaign was un-
derway. Members of the Joint Parliamentary Commission attempted to
mediate, but they could not reach an agreement (Mustapic and Geneyro
2000). On September 1, de la Rúa promised Cardoso that his govern-
ment would not endorse the controversial law, thus risking a serious
domestic conflict.
19. The fact that it was the Argentine foreign ministry—and not another executive
office—that handled the situation was acknowledged and welcomed by the Brazilian
administration (as confirmed at the Itamaraty’s Divisão do Mercosul by Mauricio Fávero,
2000), for this highlighted the political relevance of the conflict.
20. “Ley de protección a la industria azucarera. El azúcar amargó al gabinete,” Clarín,
August 30, 2000.
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Just when it seemed that things could get no worse, the Gordian knot
was cut by President de la Rúa: on September 4 he vetoed the law, only
to sign a resolution with the same contents (though it also established a
five-year limit). The goal was twofold. On the one hand, the decision
prevented an open-ended escalation between congresses, expediently
removing the issue from the legislative arena. On the other hand, a de-
cree in place of a law improved the executive’s negotiation power, as it
enabled the Argentine president to ensure his Brazilian counterpart that
the decree would be lifted as soon as an agreement was reached, with-
out having to go through an uncertain legislative process.21 Subsequently,
both presidents agreed to initiate a round of negotiations with the object
of incorporating sugar into the free trade zone, along the lines mani-
fested in the communiqué of Buenos Aires of June 30.
This event shows how the presidents have chosen to take all respon-
sibility whenever MERCOSUR undergoes a serious conflict. They have
done so even at the expense of relinquishing the likely benefits that could
be extracted from a two-level game (see Putnam 1988). When negotiat-
ing with foreign partners, the presidents can no longer argue that do-
mestic institutions keep their hands tied, as they have made it clear that
no actor stands above the presidential will.
Vigevani et al. (2001) argue that the sugar issue exposes the inad-
equacy of MERCOSUR structures for overcoming threats posed by nega-
tively affected interest groups. They describe how Argentine and
Brazilian social and economic groups organized themselves at the na-
tional level to defend their interests. Pressure was aimed at national law-
makers in both countries, bringing about a confrontation between the
two congresses and engendering a diplomatic crisis. The evolution of
the crisis illustrates the limitations of MERCOSUR’s institutional struc-
ture, and its resolution confirms that the final dispute-settlement mecha-
nism was inter-presidential bargaining. However, as this case shows,
presidential interventions were successful because they were backed by
institutional capabilities such as veto and decree powers and because
the presidents were not accountable to the legislative branch. By con-
trast, a prime minister who vetoed or ignored a decision of the parlia-
ment might well have faced a motion of no confidence, given the
institutional characteristics of parliamentary regimes.
THE GRAND CRISIS OF 1999: MANAGEMENT AND OUTCOMES
This section analyzes the crisis triggered by the 1999 devaluation of
the Brazilian currency and the ensuing reaction of the Argentine
21. “De la Rúa firmó una resolución y vetó una ley. El azúcar, protegido hasta el 2005,”
Clarín, September 5, 2000.
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government. These developments drove the members of MERCOSUR
to the conclusion that tighter macroeconomic coordination and more
effective supervision and implementation of the common agreements
were necessary, leading to further efforts to relaunch the process in ac-
cordance with the summits of Buenos Aires (June 2000) and Florianópolis
(December 2000).
The Brazilian Devaluation and its Aftermath
Throughout most of the 1990s, both Argentina and Brazil experienced
periods of domestic turbulence due to political (uncertain electoral out-
comes) and economic (inflation or recession) reasons. However, such dif-
ficulties did not occur in both countries at the same time, which allowed
integration to continue since the largest MERCOSUR partners compen-
sated each other in times of trouble. In 1999 the situation changed radi-
cally, as both economies went simultaneously into recession. To make things
worse, Brazil was compelled to devalue its currency, a measure that threat-
ened to alter intraregional trade and investment flows dramatically.
When the Brazilian decision to devalue was adopted on January 13,
Menem was in the United States on an official visit. In Argentina, there
was criticism of the fact that the Cardoso administration had neither
consulted nor informed its partner government about a decision that
had such a deep impact on Argentina. Menem and his economy minis-
ter, Roque Fernández, refuted the criticism with two different arguments:
for Menem, the measure was technically not a devaluation; for
Fernández, it was logical that the devaluation had to be undertaken
without previous warning. In any event, the contact between both presi-
dents was so close that Menem received a phone call from Cardoso on
January 14, while he was giving a press conference.22
The Argentine reaction to the Brazilian decision was varied. Whereas
the government remained calm and sensitive to its counterpart, many rep-
resentatives of the industrial sector and the media feared a possible “ava-
lanche” of cheap goods from the giant neighbor.23 Fears of invasion by
Brazilian products were first called “efecto Brasil” and later “Brasil-
dependencia.” The former label, somewhat neutral, denoted a likely dan-
ger by contagion; the latter reflected a sentiment of subordination that
called for a protectionist reaction. The Menem administration took some
rapid measures to relieve domestic pressures, such as reducing taxes, di-
minishing import tariffs for sensitive goods coming from non-MERCOSUR
22. “Menem prometió a los inversores que la Argentina no devaluará,” Clarín, Janu-
ary 1, 1999.
23. “Efecto Brasil: Temen avalancha de productos brasileños por la devaluación. Los
industriales pedirán medidas de protección,” Clarín, January 17, 1999.
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countries, and asking the Brazilian government to eliminate distorting
subsidies. All this was insufficient to dissipate the public concern, and the
Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) insisted on a rise in tariffs.24
The months following the devaluation witnessed increasing tension
between the largest MERCOSUR members. All South American coun-
tries except Bolivia, the smallest economy in the region, and Argentina
had adjusted their exchange rate after Brazil. In Argentina, the Convert-
ibility Plan—a law that tied the national currency to the dollar—pre-
vented such a response. In February, the presidents and ministers of
Argentina and Brazil met twice: first in Mexico, in the framework of a
Rio Group meeting, and later on February 12 in São José dos Campos, in
Brazil. These summits were not enough to ease the apprehensions due
to the ongoing Brazilian crisis, so in April the Argentine government
had to act to calm the domestic front.
Between April and July, the Argentine executive issued three rulings
to promote balanced trade with Brazil. On April 19, Resolution 458 put
in motion an antidumping procedure against steel imports; on July 14,
Resolution 861 fixed import quotas for textiles; finally, on July 26, Reso-
lution 911 incorporated a Latin American Integration Association
(ALADI) norm into Argentine legislation to allow the country to apply
safeguard measures. It made no mention of exceptions for MERCOSUR
members, so it could be interpreted as an attempt to establish trade bar-
riers via import quotas, in open conflict with MERCOSUR rules. The
Brazilian government reacted strongly: for the first time since the cre-
ation of the bloc, it announced through Undersecretary of Foreign Trade
José Alfredo Graça Lima that all negotiations were suspended.25 A year
later Graça Lima (2000) diplomatically downplayed these events, pre-
ferring to speak of “trade confrontation” rather than political crisis.
However, the magnitude of the controversy can hardly be overlooked;
indeed, most key protagonists viewed it as the most critical moment
since 1985.
During the hard times between the Brazilian devaluation in January
and the Argentine Resolution 911 in July, some progress had been made.
On April 28, the first ruling was issued by the ad hoc tribunal set up
after the Protocol of Brasília, generating expectations of a legal institu-
tionalization of MERCOSUR procedures. Shortly after that, on June 7,
Menem and Cardoso held a meeting in Olivos, first alone, and then with
their foreign ministers, at which time they seemed to reach agreements
on fiscal responsibility and macroeconomic coordination. A week later,
on June 14, they met again in Asunción in the friendly context of the
24. “Los industriales insisten con subir los aranceles,” Clarín, January 22, 1999.
25. “Presión por las medidas ’proteccionistas’ de la Argentina. El gobierno de Brasil
pidió una reunión urgente del Mercosur,” Clarín, August 27, 1999.
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MERCOSUR biannual summit, together with the presidents of Paraguay
and Uruguay. However, by the end of July the dialogue between Argen-
tina and Brazil was over. Domestic pressure for tougher measures was
mounting on both sides, and the prospects of MERCOSUR seemed bleak.
Paulo Skaf, chief of the Brazilian Garment Industries Association, went
as far as to state, “this is the first step towards the end of MERCOSUR.”26
How could such a dismal ending be prevented?
CIRCUMVENTING THE CABINETS: PARALLEL DIPLOMACY ENDORSED BY
PRESIDENTIAL CAPABILITIES
On July 26, the Brazilian government accused Argentina of “an ex-
plicit violation of the Treaty of Asunción,” and denounced “an alarming
regression in the development of the integration process” in a letter sent
to the temporary president of MERCOSUR in Montevideo.27 After de-
claring a halt to all negotiations, the government requested an urgent
bilateral meeting to protest the quotas and attempt to prevent their ex-
tension. Both administrations were internally split over the issue. The
Argentine foreign ministry blamed Secretary of Industry Alieto Guadagni
for promoting the controversial resolutions, whereas the latter accused
Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella of nurturing Brazilian distrust by uni-
laterally applying for NATO membership. In Brazil, the position of the
hard-liners and soft-liners was reversed: while ministers of finance, Pedro
Malan, and of industry and trade, Clovis Carvalho, seemed to sympa-
thize with the Argentine position, Foreign Minister Lampreia was ex-
tremely harsh. Knowing that Menem was planning to travel to Brazil in
August, Lampreia discouraged the visit, publicly declaring on July 27
that the political climate was not propitious for a presidential summit.
On July 28, Cardoso’s spokesman added that the presidential visit
“should be postponed until times are better.”28
However, on July 29 the Argentine presidential plane landed in Brasília
unexpectedly, and Menem was on board. After dinner at the presidential
residence, the two presidents gave a press conference where they denied
the existence of any differences between the two countries. What can ex-
plain such a sudden shift from bitter anger to intimate friendship?
Menem had arrived in Brasília from New Orleans, where he had been
taking part in a hemispheric conference of energy ministers. A technical
stop late on Thursday in Manaus, in the north of Brazil, had been pro-
grammed for the trip home. On Wednesday morning, however, when
26. Idem.
27. “Maratón de reuniones en Buenos Aires. Argentina discutirá con Brasil la crisis
comercial,” Clarín, July 28, 1999.
28. “De Manaos a Brasília,” Clarín, July 30, 1999.
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Menem was boarding the plane to go to New Orleans, Di Tella sug-
gested that he arrange a summit with Cardoso. Menem agreed. Di Tella
wanted an open-ended meeting to allow the two countries to harmo-
nize positions without giving the impression of an Argentine defeat.
The secretary general of the Argentine presidency, Alberto Kohan, had
other plans, though.
Kohan was one of the men closest to the president. He was known
for his conflictive nature within the cabinet: he had confronted many
ministers with the aim of surrounding Menem with people that he
trusted. Menem’s style of command was based on a double-checking
system: he would instruct two subordinates to carry out the same mis-
sion separately, enabling him to play one against the other. Kohan was
his preferred emissary when it came to leading parallel political opera-
tions of this kind, although such operations were usually only used in
the domestic arena. Parallel international diplomacy was a new, more
serious practice.
Kohan bypassed Foreign Minister Di Tella and telephoned Lampreia.
On his way to the United States on Wednesday evening, Kohan told the
Brazilian minister that Menem had decided to exclude Brazil from the
scope of Resolution 911. They then agreed that the stopover on the way
back from New Orleans to Buenos Aires would be in Brasília rather than
Manaus so that the two presidents could meet. Notwithstanding his
previous warnings against Menem visiting Brazil, Lampreia diplomati-
cally accepted the new arrangement. Di Tella, who had stayed in Buenos
Aires, had to come to terms with this fait accompli, which confirmed
that he had been sidelined and that his substantive plans had been ig-
nored. In his view, Kohan’s conditions were closer to capitulation than
to negotiation. However, he called in his associates and decided to adapt
his strategy to the new situation, preparing to travel to Brasília the fol-
lowing day. As usual, government officials and business associations
alike made no mention of the possibility of resorting to the Protocol of
Brasília or the Joint Parliamentary Commission of MERCOSUR.
On Wednesday, before Menem’s arrival, Di Tella, Guadagni and the
undersecretary of Foreign Trade, Félix Peña, arrived from Buenos Aires
and met with Lampreia. The climate was tense. The Argentines informed
Lampreia that safeguards against Brazil were to be lifted and requested
special treatment in light of the exceptional situation brought about by
the devaluation. Lampreia showed little concern, however. He claimed
that Argentina had “crossed the red line” and reaffirmed that
MERCOSUR would be destroyed if the safeguards were applied. Later
on, the foreign ministers participated in the presidential meeting, and
Lampreia repeated his strongly worded complaints to Menem, also ask-
ing for written confirmation of the new Argentine decision. To this
Menem answered that his word was sufficient guarantee. At this point,
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President Cardoso intervened, siding with his Argentine counterpart to
ease the tension.29 At the end of the day, both presidents appeared to-
gether for the “photo op,” while their foreign ministers gave the press
details of the agreement.
Argentine diplomacy had calmed the Brazilian government, but it
was unable to prevent negative public comment. On Friday, the news-
papers in Buenos Aires considered that Argentina had given in: “Ar-
gentina Gives Up and MERCOSUR Tension Declines.”30 Argentine
officials did their best to counter this view, but their efforts were not
rewarded. By the time that the following extraordinary meeting of the
CMC took place a few days later in Montevideo, Menem had already
issued Resolution 955 exempting MERCOSUR countries from the ef-
fects of Resolution 911.
In the episode just related, Menem affirmed his supremacy vis-à-vis
the cabinet and the diplomatic corps. Under his personal supervision,
his right-hand man had gone above the heads of politicians and bureau-
crats to arrange a meeting with the Brazilian president, one that inci-
dentally also contravened the public position of the Brazilian foreign
minister. Thereafter, the presidents settled the dispute alone. When asked
why Di Tella had accepted Kohan’s parallel diplomatic efforts without
complaint, a chief Argentine official replied off the record that the for-
eign minister was ready to accept any conditions as long as he could
stay in office (author’s interview). Thus, on this occasion, as before, he
had accepted a presidential fait accompli.
Norberto Moretti, secretary of the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires,
argues that Menem was able to stop over in Brasília because of the previ-
ous decision to withdraw Resolution 911 (Moretti 1999). He paid a do-
mestic price for this, as the industrial sector and most congressional groups
demanded more, not less, protection against the Brazilian “threat.” How-
ever, at the advice by Jorge Campbell, Menem had decided to prioritize
MERCOSUR over transitory domestic issues, and he possessed the insti-
tutional capabilities to do so. Clearly, the system of collective responsibil-
ity that characterizes parliamentary cabinets would never have given a
chief executive such autonomous room to maneuver.
CONCLUSION
The three cases analyzed above show the extent to which presiden-
tial intervention boosted the process of integration and shaped its out-
come, with presidents acting not only as decision makers but also as
dispute settlers and guarantors of commitments. The presidents were
29. “Entretelones de un día muy agitado. El palo y la zanahoria,” Clarín, July 31, 1999.
30. “Argentina cedió y bajó la tensión en el Mercosur,” Clarín, July 30, 1999.
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perceived to be efficient problem solvers because they had popular le-
gitimacy and the determination to intervene. However, the tasks they
performed were not merely based on charismatic leadership but also on
institutional capabilities. In order to negotiate and secure agreements
with their counterparts, Menem, Cardoso and de la Rúa made extensive
use of the prerogatives granted to them by national constitutions and
legislation. These prerogatives allowed the presidents to overwhelm
other potential veto players such as the cabinet—including the economy
and foreign ministers, who did not always belong to the president’s
party—and the congress in ways not available either to parliamentary
or balanced presidential regimes. The presidents were also reluctant to
build up regional institutions or to relinquish their competences to the
regional institutions that did exist.
The degree of concentration of power exerts a differential impact on
governmental capacities. Concentration of power is regarded as prefer-
able when it comes to steering capacities—active policy making—whereas
diffusion of power is more closely related to maintenance and political
capacities (Rockman 1997; Weaver and Rockman 1993). This article ar-
gues that the concentrationist brand of presidentialism of the Argentine
and Brazilian systems of government has helped promote regional inte-
gration in two ways: first, the constitutional capabilities of the presidents
vis-à-vis other actors have made it credible that their policies would not
be blocked. Second, the preeminence of the presidents has provided so-
cial actors with a single, non-bureaucratic target through which to chan-
nel their interests, allowing for a faster decision-making process. As a
result, presidential intervention in the management of MERCOSUR has
become a structural element of the integration process.
Conceivably, there are other reasons that help to explain the large
room to maneuver enjoyed by the presidents. Among them, the tradi-
tion of executive supremacy in domestic politics is not without impor-
tance. A second is the feeble institutionalization of MERCOSUR, which
features neither veto points nor veto players that can block presidential
interventions. Finally, the absence or weakness of relevant social actors
calling for enhanced participation facilitates the predominance of presi-
dential decisions. These factors only add to the institutional resources
already in the hands of the chief executives.
State-led, presidential-driven integration has been a persistent feature
of MERCOSUR, as has been the low level of involvement of business or-
ganizations, particularly in Argentina and Brazil (Schneider 2001). As noted
above, this represents a deviation from expected theoretical outcomes, since
both liberal intergovernmentalism and supranational governance suggest
that governmental action is a result of sectoral or functional demands. In
MERCOSUR, the evolution of business involvement in the integration
process also diverged from that of other Latin American regional schemes.
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Schneider (2001) shows that both Chilean and Mexican business organi-
zations have had a much more active role in fostering and shaping open
regionalism than their equivalents in Argentina and Brazil. This phenom-
enon is not only a product of the greater strength and organization of key
Chilean and Mexican social actors, as Schneider correctly points out, but
also of the lesser power of their presidential offices—be it lesser partisan
powers as in Chile, or lesser constitutional powers as in Mexico
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 432; Siavelis 2002).31 In MERCOSUR, the
limited intervention of entrepreneurs and business peak associations—
even when they were invited to participate—did little to curtail the power
held by the presidents. On the contrary, “the scarce participation of the
private sector in the institutional structure implied that its interests were
channeled through lobbying national negotiators rather than through for-
mal means at the regional level” (Redrado 1999, 143). Thus, informal lob-
bying through direct executive agents is a relevant factor that also accounts
for executive supremacy.
Some public officials believe that the troubles of MERCOSUR do not
stem from the integration process itself but from the recurring crises of
its member countries (Pereira 2000). In this context, stronger institution-
alization would not solve its troubles; rather, it may accentuate them by
adding institutional discredit to enduring ineffectiveness. Accomplish-
ing a common market may require stronger institutions, but until 1999,
MERCOSUR performed reasonably well without them. However, there
was by then a growing awareness of the overwhelming position of the
presidents, which ignited public debate on the issue. In 1999, former
Uruguayan president Luis A. Lacalle stated that the MERCOSUR secre-
tariat should be reinforced so as not to erode the image of the presi-
dents.32 In 2000, Chilean president Ricardo Lagos was even more explicit:
“Whenever there are difficulties between our countries, the politics of
the ’presidential phone’ do not work. It is not possible for presidents to
work things by getting involved in routine fights on the phone.”33 Con-
trary to Lagos’s statement, and regardless of how undesirable it may
appear, this kind of politics was not only possible but also effective. Above
all, it was accepted and stimulated by the presidents of the largest mem-
ber countries.
31. Although Mainwaring and Shugart classify the Brazilian presidency similarly to
the Chilean, recent studies have shown that the partisan (and coalitional) powers of the
Brazilian president are actually higher than they expected (Cheibub and Limongi 2002;
Figueiredo and Limongi 2000).
32. “Mercosur: Lacalle pide no desgastar la imagen de los presidentes,” El Observador,
August 3, 1999. Lacalle sought to preserve presidential power for crucial issues. Coher-
ently, he advocated the direct effect of regional normative in order to increase presidential
power on regional matters, vis-à-vis domestic actors such as the Congress (Lacalle 2001).
33. “El Mercosur tiene que integrarse en serio,” Clarín, May 14, 2000.
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In January 2000, the Brazilian government created the office of the
Special Ambassador to MERCOSUR and appointed ambassador José
Botafogo Gonçalves to the post. The intention was to demonstrate that
MERCOSUR was a priority for the Cardoso administration. Up until
then, it had been the Undersecretary of Trade and Economic Integration
of the Foreign Ministry, Alfredo Graça Lima, who had conducted coor-
dination tasks for MERCOSUR. As he later underlined, the new office
depended on the presidency and was not part of the structure of the
foreign ministry (Graça Lima 2000). This meant that, even in the coun-
try with the most professional diplomatic corps, the president decided
to keep direct command of MERCOSUR affairs.
To be sure, summit diplomacy is not a feature exclusive to
MERCOSUR. The originality of MERCOSUR resides in its being the most
significant regional bloc whose chief executives are all presidents and
whose regional institutions are negligible. Provided that domestic re-
gimes have an impact upon international relations, it is conceivable that
not only the democracy-autocracy dichotomy but also the presidential-
parliamentary distinction is likely to make a difference. This paper shows
how the presidents of MERCOSUR countries have contributed to shape
the integration process and to make it work by making use of their insti-
tutional and political capacities.
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